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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of fiscal policy on private investment for a sample of
thirty-three LDCs. The paper makes a number of important contributions to the existing
empirical literature. Its main contribution is that it is the first attempt to analyse the
existence of a non-linear relationship between fiscal policy variables and investment.
Moreover, we explicitly focus on different aspects of fiscal policy and their influence on
investment, instead of only looking at aggregate fiscal policy variables.
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Introduction
During the 1980s and 1990s many less developed countries (LDCs) have obtained
structural adjustment loans financed by the World Bank or the IMF. These loans aim at
helping these countries to reduce structural imbalances, which led to the stagnation of
their economic growth performance in both decades.1 An important element of these
loans is that their disbursement is conditional on changes of economic policy, specified
in a so-called structural adjustment programme. An important part of the proposed
policy changes in the programmes focuses on fiscal adjustment and the restructuring of
the public sector. According to the World Bank and IMF, the structural imbalances have
been caused to a large extent by high fiscal deficits and a large and inefficiently
functioning public sector. Therefore, many programmes aim to reduce government
spending and to raise revenues, through measures such as reducing the civil service
wage bill, tax reform, and the reduction of subsidies.2 The IMF- and World Bank-
sponsored programmes seem to assume that reducing fiscal deficits is beneficial for the
long-run growth process, no matter how such a reduction is achieved. But is this really
true?
While these policy prescriptions are a dominant element in the programmes, in the
empirical literature there is no consensus regarding the impact of fiscal policy on
macroeconomic performance in LDCs. The differences in outcomes may at least partly
be explained by methodological weaknesses of these studies. First, a large number of
studies only focus on aggregate variables of fiscal policy, such as, e.g., government
consumption, overall taxes, or budget deficits. Thus, they disregard the importance of
the composition of fiscal policies and thereby overlook the possibility that different
policies may have different effects on macroeconomic variables (Gemmell 2000).
Second, the empirical literature does not deal with the question whether the relationship
between different fiscal variables and macroeconomic performance can be non-linear.3
There may, however, be good reasons to believe that such a non-linear relationship
exists, at least for specific fiscal variables.
The lack of convincing empirical evidence may lead to the wrong policy advice to LDC
countries that are currently struggling with structural imbalances. These countries may
need to reduce large fiscal deficits, but they do not have a clear guide of how to achieve
this without hurting their long-term economic prospects. Which components of
spending should be reduced and which taxes can be raised without disturbing private
initiatives? Moreover, the lack of clear empirical evidence may hamper the design of so-
called second-generation economic reforms for countries (Adam and Bevan 2000).
These countries may have managed to bring their fiscal deficits under control, but do
not know what combination of public spending and revenues will be most helpful to
1 See Addison (2000) for a discussion of the causes and consequences of fiscal imbalances in LDCs.
2 See Lienert and Modi (1997) for a general overview of civil service reforms in the 1980s and early
1990s for a sample of 32 Sub-Saharan African countries.
3 An exception is Devarajan et al. (1996). They focus on fiscal policy and growth. Moreover, they only
focus on two fiscal policy variables (current expenditures and capital expenditures) when evaluating
the existence of non-linear relationships between fiscal policy and growth.2
achieve higher growth and poverty reduction. Thus, there is clearly a need for an in-
depth analysis into the effects of fiscal policy variables on macroeconomic performance.
This paper aims to contribute to the empirical literature on the relationship between
fiscal variables and macroeconomic performance. In particular, we make the following
four important contributions:
i) We empirically analyse the impact of fiscal policy on macroeconomic
performance for a sample of 33 LDCs. Empirical evidence on this issue is
scarce for these countries.
ii) We specifically look at the impact of fiscal policy on private investment. Most
studies focus on the relationship between fiscal policy and growth.
iii) We explicitly focus on different aspects of fiscal policy and their influence on
private investment, instead of only looking at aggregate fiscal policy variables.
We claim that this is the first paper providing a comprehensive study of the
relationship between a large number of government expenditure and revenue
categories, and private investment.
iv) However, the main contribution of this paper to the empirical literature is that
it is the first serious attempt to analyse the existence of a non-linear
relationship between fiscal policy variables and private investment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents a survey of the theoretical and
empirical literature on the relationship between fiscal policy and private investment.
Section 2 discusses the data and the econometric methodology used in this paper, while
section 3 discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents concluding
remarks and suggestions for further research.
1 Fiscal policy and private investment: a survey of the theoretical and empirical
literature
What does theory tell us about the relationship between fiscal policy and private
investment? What is the empirical evidence on this relationship? And what can we learn
from the theoretical and empirical literature for the design of fiscal policy adjustment
programmes aiming at increasing private investment, and achieving higher growth and
more poverty reduction? Before discussing the theoretical and empirical literature on
these issues, we shortly explain why we focus on private investment, instead of on
economic growth, as has been done in most of the existing literature.4
1.1 Why focus on private investment?
Structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and IMF emphasise the need to
reduce government budget deficits in order to stimulate private initiative. The fiscal
policy adjustments described in the programmes signify a reduced role of government in
the economy. The reduction of the role of government in the economy of LDCs is a key
4 Gemmell (2000) and Odedokun (2000) deal with the relationship between fiscal policy and growth.3
element of the Washington consensus, which aims at increasing the role of the market
mechanism.5 According to the World Bank and IMF reducing the role of the
government will reduce barriers to private initiative and will stimulate investment
activities, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Increased investment ultimately leads to
higher economic growth. In our analysis we focus on the impact of fiscal policy on the
quantity of investment and therefore implicitly investigate to what extent and under
what conditions IMF and World Bank are right to emphasise the positive effects of their
fiscal policy recommendations.
Another reason to focus on private investment is that other studies have shown that a
disproportionate share of the change of economic growth of countries is explained by a
change of private investment as a result from changes in fiscal policy.6 This result
stresses the importance of effects of fiscal policy on the quantity of investment. Our
discussion of the theoretical literature may help to explain why quantity effects appear
to be so important.
1.2 Theory of the relationship between fiscal policy and private investment7
As was already noted, most of the theoretical (and empirical) literature looks at the
relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth. Yet, this literature is also
important for evaluating the relationship between fiscal policy and private investment.
As the discussion below will show, one of the main channels through which fiscal
policy has an influence on growth is via its impact on private investment.
The theoretical literature on the relationship between fiscal policy and growth has
grown substantially since the mid-1980s, when the endogenous growth models
emerged. According to these models, the process of economic growth is endogenously
determined. A crucial difference with neo-classical growth models is that these new
growth models do not assume diminishing marginal productivity of capital.
Consequently, (changes in) the capital stock can affect the long-run per capita growth
rate, either via a quantity (i.e. more investment) or a quality (i.e. more efficient
investment) effect. These new growth models, therefore, conclude that economic policy
—among which is also fiscal policy—can increase the steady-state economic growth
rate, if policies aim at influencing the quantity and/or quality of the capital stock.
Examples of endogenous growth models incorporating the role of fiscal policy are Barro
(1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), King and Rebelo (1990) and Rebelo (1991).
The exact nature of the impact of fiscal policy on economic growth according to these
models depends on the type of fiscal policy instruments used. In particular, the growth
effects of fiscal policy can be divided into productive and non-productive expenditures,
and distortionary and non-distortionary taxes (Kneller, et al. 1999; Gemmell 2000).
5 See Stiglitz (1998) for a critique of the Washington consensus.
6 See, for example, Chhibber and Dailami (1993). See also Alesina et al. (1998). This study looks at
fiscal policy effects on private investment for OECD countries, however.
7 For an extensive overview of the literature on the relationship between fiscal policy and growth we
refer to Gemmell (2000). Parts of this section draw from this paper.4
Productive expenditures and non-distortionary taxes stimulate growth, whereas non-
productive expenditures and distortionary taxes reduce growth.
When government expenditures create positive production externalities, focus on
enhancing innovation and research and development and/or stimulate the accumulation
of private capital, these expenditures are seen as productive. It is generally assumed that
public investment in infrastructure, education and health belong to this category
(Aschauer 1989; Kneller et al. 1999). In these cases, public investment is said to crowd-
in private investment.
However, if financial resources are scarce, public investment may also reduce the
possibilities of the private sector to obtain credit to finance investment. Moreover, if
public investment is financed through monetary financing, private investment may be
seriously discouraged (Ramirez 1996). In these cases public investment is said to
crowd-out private investment opportunities (Buiter 1977).
Examples of non-productive government expenditures are subsidisation of inefficient
state-owned enterprises or enterprises that produce market goods. Moreover, spending
on salaries of public servants is often regarded as non-productive. The main channel
through which this latter spending category influences private investment negatively is
through the pressure it puts on raising wages in the private sector. This reduces costs
and thus increases profitability of investment, which in turn may increase investment
activity (Alesina et al. 1999).
Government tax policy is non-distortive when this policy does not influence investment
decisions (either in physical or human capital). An example of a non-distortive tax is the
value-added tax (VAT). Distortive taxes, on the other hand, do influence the investment
decisions of the private sector. In general, many tax policies (with VAT being one of the
few exceptions) are seen as distortionary in this respect. Raising labour taxes, for
example, may lead to higher wage. Such a rise of wages will depress profitability of
private investment. Moreover, increases in social security contributions may lead to
higher real wage demands. Again, a rise of real wages will reduce the real rate of return
on investment, thus adversely affecting investment activity (Alesina et al. 1999). High
corporate income taxes depress the rate of return on investment, thereby distorting
investment decisions.
Categorising government expenditures and revenues as being productive/non-
productive and distortive/non-distortive, respectively, may not be easy in practice,
however. Expenditures on infrastructure, for example, may be productive in one case,
but may equally well be unproductive in other cases. Several LDCs have made
infrastructure investments that later on became to be known as so-called “white
elephants”. At the same time, spending on salaries may have positive demand-side
effects that compensate for the negative effects mentioned above.
Next to focussing on different fiscal policy instruments, we may also look at the impact
of budget deficits on economic growth. In general, budget deficits are assumed to have a
negative impact on growth. First, high deficits may signal a high tax burden in the
future. This may discourage current aggregate expenditures, and thus also private
investment. Several models investigate this issue. In all these models expectations of the
public with respect to the future effects of current (adjustments of) budget deficits are5
crucial. Examples of models on this issue are Bertola and Drazen (1993), Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990 and 1996) and Sutherland (1997).8
In some these models, emphasis is put on the role of specific deficit adjustments on
growth. These models show that reducing expenditure on particular components of the
government budget may provide a positive signal with respect to the seriousness of the
government to implement a fiscal adjustment programme. Cutting the wage bill and
reducing subsidies on primary goods are difficult to implement from a political
economy point of view. Thus, cuts in these kinds of government expenditures may lend
credibility to the adjustment efforts of the government, which may stimulate private
investment.
Second, high budget deficits may lead to higher real interest rates in financial markets,
which may reduce investment and growth. Moreover, high budget deficits may increase
risk premiums on interest rates, in particular raising the inflation risk and the default
risk premium. High interest rate risk premiums may discourage private investment
(Alesina and Perotti 1997). Finally, when high deficits are financed with financial
market loans, this may decrease the opportunities of the private sector to borrowing.9
To conclude, the brief summary of the theoretical literature presented above has made
clear that fiscal policy can influence economic growth in a number of ways. Moreover,
it has also been shown that one of the main channels through which fiscal policy has an
influence on growth is via its impact on private investment. Another conclusion that can
be drawn from the above discussion is that the relationship between fiscal policy and
growth is not always clear-cut and in some cases theories differ in their view on the
direction of the relationship between the two variables. This means that the relationship
between fiscal policy variables and growth (and private investment) becomes an
empirical question.
1.3 Empirical evidence of the relationship between fiscal policy and private
investment
1.3.1 Fiscal policy and growth
There is quite a large literature focussing on the effects of fiscal policy on economic
growth.10 The main part of these studies concentrates on analysing these effects for
OECD countries. The major part of empirical analyses of the relationship between fiscal
policy and growth may be divided into two different categories. First, a large number of
studies focus on aggregate variables of fiscal policy, such as taxation, investment
spending or consumption spending. They disregard the importance of the composition
8 The argument central to all these models is sometimes referred to as the “wealth effect cum
expectations” argument (see, e.g., Perotti 1996).
9 See also Adam and Bevan (2000) on this point. They analyse the impact of fiscal adjustment on the
supply of bank credit to the private sector.
10 Gemmell (2000) provides an excellent survey of the empirical literature on the relationship between
fiscal policy and economic growth.6
of fiscal policies, thereby overlooking the possibility that different policies may have
different effects on growth. The findings of these studies show mixed results.
Second, few studies investigate the impact of specific components of fiscal policy on
growth. One of the most comprehensive studies in this category is the one by Devarajan
et al. (1996) who look at different components of government expenditures. It is also
one of the few studies including LDCs in the sample of countries. Also the findings of
this category of studies show mixed results. An interesting finding of the study by
Devarajan et al. (1996) is that the outcomes for OECD countries and LDCs are
different. Whereas capital expenditure has a positive and government consumption a
negative effect on growth for OECD countries, the reverse is true for LDCs.
1.3.2 Fiscal policy and investment
When we turn to the empirical analysis of the relationship between fiscal policy and
private investment, it appears that the relationship between public and private
investment has received quite a lot of attention, both for developed countries as well as
for LDCs. As was discussed above, in the literature it is pointed out that public
investment may either crowd-in or crowd-out private investment. In a seminal
contribution, Aschauer (1989) shows that for the United States—using data for the
1949-1985 period—there is a strong positive relationship between productivity and the
ratio of the public investment to the private capital stock. Thus, he finds evidence for a
crowding-in effect of public investment. Several authors have elaborated on the work of
Aschauer and have looked at the issue for other developed countries.11 A number of
studies have investigated the relationship between public and private investment for
LDCs. The evidence on these countries is less clear-cut. Although most studies find a
positive relationship, in some cases a negative relationship has been reported.12
Apart from these studies on the relationship between public and private investment,
very little empirical research is available on the impact of other fiscal variables on
investment. One of the very few studies we were able to trace in this respect is the paper
by Alesina et al. (1999). This paper analyses the influence of public wages on private
investment. The authors use data for 18 OECD countries during the 1960-1996 period.
According to their outcomes a reduction of the government wage bill has a substantial
positive influence on private investment. Moreover, they investigate the impact of
labour taxes on profits and investment. Although a rise of these taxes reduces profits
and thus investment, the impact is less strong. No evidence is able for these effects in
LDCs.
11 See, e.g.,A r g i m o net al. (1997) for 14 OECD countries; Erenburg (1993) for the United States;
Monadjemi (1993) for the United States and Australia; Pereira and Sagales (1999) for Spain; Sturm
(1998) and Sturm et al. (1999) for the Netherlands. See also Gramlich (1994) for a comprehensive
overview of the literature on the impact of infrastructure investment.
12 See, e.g., Blejer and Kahn (1984) for a sample of 24 LDCs; Odedokun (1997) for a sample of 48
countries; Ramirez (2000) for eight Latin American countries; Nazmi and Ramirez (1997) for Mexico;
De Oliveira-Cruz and Teixeira (1999) for Brazil; Ekpo (1999) for Nigeria; Sobhee (1999) for
Mauritius; and Ghali (1998) for Tunisia.7
1.4 Is the relationship between fiscal policy and private investment non-linear?
The empirical literature discussed in the previous sub-section only considers linear
relations between fiscal policy on the one hand and investment and growth on the other
hand.13 It generally does not address the possibility that the magnitude of government
expenditures and revenues matters for the impact of fiscal policies on investment and
growth, i.e. the relationship may be non-linear.14 Yet, there are strong reasons to believe
that the relationship between different fiscal policy variables and private investment and
growth can be non-linear.
The existence of such non-linear relationships may be described as follows:
— Investment in infrastructure may become effective only after some point, since
infrastructure investment usually is associated with large (positive)
externalities.
— Expenditures on defence may be associated with positive spill-overs, since the
defence industry involves a lot of research and development activity.
— Education and health services may stimulate investment and growth through
stimulating factor accumulation; yet, after some point, raising expenditures on
these categories may retard investment and growth, since their operation starts
to become inefficient. Thus there is an optimum level of operation with respect
to education and health services.
— The distortionary effect of taxes on private investment decisions may become
only effective after taxes have reached a minimum level. This refers to the
famous tax Laffer curve.
— The central government needs a sufficient number of civil servants in order to
offer public services efficiently. After a certain number of civil servants,
however, the efficiency of services may reduce. This suggests that there is an
optimal number of civil servants, and thus of government spending on their
wages, associated with efficient public services. This optimum level may
depend on the type (and number) of services provided.
These examples clearly show the importance of analysing whether or not the
relationship between different fiscal policy variables and private investment is non-
linear. As far as we know, no study has yet analysed the non-linear relationship between
different categories of fiscal policy and investment in LDCs. Devarajan et al. (1996) is
the only study investigating non-linear relationships, in their case between current and
capital expenditure and growth.
13 In the theoretical literature the papers by Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) explicitly take into
account the possibility of a non-linear relationship between fiscal policy and growth.
14 The existence of non-linear relationships has been investigated in other areas of the empirical growth
literature. In particular, this phenomenon has been analysed in studies investigating the effects of
inflation on economic growth. See, e.g., Ghosh and Wolf (1998) and Ghosh and Phillips (1998).8
1.5 Theory and evidence on fiscal policy and private investment: An evaluation
Based on this short review of the empirical literature on the relationship between fiscal
policy and investment and growth we conclude the following:
— Most studies focus on OECD countries; empirical research for LDCs is scarce.
— The main part of the literature focuses on aggregate fiscal variables, rather than
on different fiscal policy variables.
— Generally, the findings of the empirical literature on the relationship between
fiscal policy and growth show mixed results. Moreover, the scarcely available
evidence seems to suggest that the relationship between fiscal policy and
growth is different for LDCs as compared to OECD countries.
— Only a few studies investigate the relationship between fiscal policy variables
and private investment, with the exception of the relationship between public
and private investment. Studies on this latter issue show mixed results.
— No studies are available that investigate whether fiscal policy and investment
may be described by a non-linear relationship.
Thus, overlooking the available empirical literature, our analysis in this paper can make
a valuable contribution, since we focus on the impact of the different fiscal policy
variables on private investment for a set of LDCs. Most importantly, however, this
paper makes a valuable contribution because it is the first study ever investigating the
non-linearity of the relationship between a large number of fiscal policy variables and
private investment.
2 Data and methodology of the empirical research
Before analysing the effects of fiscal policy on private investment, we start by
discussing the data set and explaining the estimation method we use. We perform panel
estimates for a set of LDCs, using observations of variables that have been averaged
over three periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-1998. Most other studies in the
field make use of cross-country regression analysis.15 Our choice to employ panel
estimation is based on the fact that cross-country regression analysis does not take into
account time series properties.
Our panel of countries is determined by the availability of the data. Information on
private investment as well as on specific components of fiscal policy for LDCs appears
to be limited, which considerably reduces the number of countries in our analysis.16 The
amount of countries varies between 33 and 35, depending on the variables used in the
15 See, e.g., Barro (1991) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993).
16 The lack of data, especially for Sub-Saharan African countries, in general and with respect to fiscal
policy variables in particular, should be a major concern of donor organisations. Improving data
availability may improve the accountability of recipient governments with respect to the use of donor
money. Therefore, donor organisations may be advised to consider increasing their support to data
collection in these countries.9
regressions. In particular, information on most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is not
available.17
All equations are estimated by using generalised least squares (GLS) to avoid
heteroscedasticity problems.18 Moreover, all equations are estimated with fixed effects
to allow for country-specific intercepts, and with time dummies for the 1970s and
1980s.
The regression analysis is carried out as follows. We first select a restricted set of
variables, the so-called conditioning variables, which have been found to be important
in numerous other cross-country regression analyses. We are not interested in these
variables as such, but we include them in the regressions to account for possible omitted
variable bias. They are included in all regressions presented in this study.
The following conditioning variables have been found most frequently in other studies:
the logarithm of real GDP per capita, the logarithm of one plus the black market
premium, the primary and second enrolment rates, private sector credit as a percentage
of GDP, external debt as a percentage of GDP, the import plus export share of GDP, the
index for changes in the terms of trade, and the lagged value of per capita growth. We
only include the logarithm of real GDP per capita (log(gdp)) and the logarithm of one
plus the black market premium (log(1+bmp)) in all regressions. The other variables
have been excluded since they appear to be insignificant or suffer from multicollinearity
problems with respect to the GDP variable and/or the black market premium. We expect
a positive sign for GDP per capita and a negative sign for the black market premium in
all regressions.
Next, we add different fiscal policy variables in different combinations to the set of
conditioning variables. In particular, we perform the following sets of regressions. The
first set focuses on analysing linear relationships between fiscal policy variables and
private investment (Section 3.1). The regressions in this set are divided into three
categories: those focussing on total government expenditures and revenues, those
focussing on disaggregated expenditures, and those focussing on disaggregated
revenues. The second set focuses on non-linear relationships between fiscal policy
variables and private investment (Section 3.2). Again, regressions are divided into the
three categories already mentioned. All fiscal policy variables are expressed in
percentages of GDP.
Before we present and discuss our results, we briefly explain how we analyse the non-
linear relationships between fiscal policy variables and private investment. As discussed
in the previous section, we consider possible non-linear effects of different fiscal policy
variables on private investment since we hypothesise that specific government
expenditures and/or revenues start to have positive (or negative) effects on private
investment after a certain threshold value is reached. We examine the existence of a
non-linear relationship by adding a quadratic term for the different fiscal policy
variables to the regression model. A positive and significant linear term in combination
17 See Appendix B for a complete list of the countries included in our data set.
18 In alternative regressions we also use the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator. Although there are
some differences in outcome, in most cases the OLS regressions were qualitatively in line with the
GLS regressions. For reasons of space, the OLS regressions are not presented.10
with a negative and significant quadratic term suggests that the effect of a specific fiscal
policy variable on private investment can be described as an inverted-U curve. On the
other hand, a significant negative linear term in combination with a significant positive




We start the empirical analysis by considering linear relationships between the
government budget surplus (Surplus), as well as total government expenditures
(Govexp) and government revenues (Govrev), and investment.19 Table 1 shows that an
increase in the government budget surplus has a positive effect on private investment
(equation [1.1]). This result suggests that the effects of a change in the surplus, whether
caused by an increase in government revenues or a decrease in government
expenditures, are identical. However, there is no a priori reason why this should always
be the case. Therefore, we disaggregate Surplus into Govexp and Govrev. As can be
seen from Table 1, if both variables are included simultaneously, only government
expenditures are significant with a negative sign (equation [1.2]). If Govexp or Govrev
are included separately, then both seem to have a significant negative effect (equations.
[1.3] and [1.4]).
As we discussed in section 1, looking at aggregate variables of fiscal policy disregards
the importance of the composition of fiscal policies, thereby overlooking the possibility
that different fiscal policy variables may have different effects on investment.
Therefore, the next step is to disaggregate government expenditures and revenues.
Government expenditures are sub-divided into the following categories: wages and
salaries (Wages), other purchases of goods and services (Othgood), interest payments of
the government (Intp), subsidies plus other current transfers (Subs) and capital
expenditures (Capexp).
Table 2 shows that if all components are included simultaneously, Wages and Intp have
a negative effect, Capexp has a positive effects, and Subs and Othgood are insignificant
(equation [2.1]). Subs becomes significant with a negative sign when it is included
separately (equation [2.5]). The most important result from this set of regressions is that
different categories of government expenditures have different effects on private
investment. This confirms our hypothesis that it is important to distinguish different
components of government expenditures.
The regressions suggest that an increase in capital expenditures lead to an increase in
private investment. If we assume that capital expenditure mainly consists of public
investments, then this result supports the view that an increase in public investment
crowds in private investment. To further assess this result, we use a more direct measure
19 See Appendix A for a complete list of the variables used in the empirical analysis.11
of public investment (Pubinv).20 The outcome of the regression analysis including
Pubinv gives qualitatively the same result, i.e. more public investment crowds-in private
investment (equation [2.7]).
The results in equation [2.1] also indicate that increasing wage expenditures reduces
private investment. An alternative measure of such expenditures is total government
consumption (Govcon). Wage expenditures are the most important component of
government consumption. The regression including Govcon confirms the result found
for wages (equation [2.8]).
Government expenditures may also be functionally disaggregated into defence
expenditures (Defence), education expenditures (Education), health expenditures
(Health), expenditures on economic affairs and services (Econaf) and expenditures on
social security and welfare (Socsec). Table 3 shows the regression results when we use
these categories of government expenditures. The general conclusion from this table is
that again different spending categories have different effects on investment. Education
has no (or a negative) effect on investment (equations [3.1] and [3.3]). Also for Defence
no (or a negative) effect on investment is found (equations [3.1] and [3.2]). Health and
Socsec have a significant negative effect on private investment, whereas Econaf has a
significant positive effect (equations [3.3]-[3.5]).
Finally, we disaggregate government revenues into the following categories: taxes on
income and profits (Taxprof), domestic taxes on goods and services (Domtax), taxes on
international trade and transactions (Taxinttr) and non-tax revenues (Nontax). The
results of the regressions are presented in Table 4. The regression results suggest that an
increase in Taxprof and Nontax have favourable effects on private investment, whereas
an increase in Domtax and Taxinttr lead to a decrease in private investment (equation
[4.1]).
3.2 Non-linear relationships
The results discussed in the previous sub-section do not take into account the possibility
that the relationship between fiscal policy variables and investment may be non-linear.
Yet, in section 1 we explained why such relationships might exist, at least for several
government expenditure and/or revenue categories. The results found for the linear
relations between fiscal policy variables and investment may change when we consider
the possibility of non-linear relationships. Whether such non-linear relationships
actually exist is an empirical question to which we turn in this sub-section.
We first consider non-linear relationships between the government budget surplus
(Surplus), as well as total government expenditures (Govexp) and government revenues
(Govrev), and investment. The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 5.
With respect to the budget surplus the results suggest that there are increasing returns
with respect to this variable: both the linear term and the quadratic term of Surplus are
significant and have a positive sign (equation [5.1]). Next, if both linear and quadratic
20 Note that the set of countries for this regression differs slightly from the regression results in equation
[2.1].12
terms of Govexp and Govrev are included simultaneously, all coefficients become
insignificant (equation [5.2]). This may be due to multicollinearity and/ or aggregation
problems. If only linear and quadratic terms for Govexp or Govrev are included in the
regression, then the results suggest that low levels of government revenues do not hurt
private investment, whereas government revenues reduce private investment at high
levels (equation [5.4]). Thus, we find evidence for an inverted-U curve with respect to
the relationship between government revenues and investment. We conclude that the
results of the analysis of non-linear relationships provide a different picture when
compared to the results of the analysis of linear relationships between fiscal policy and
investment.
Next, we discuss non-linear effects of different categories of government expenditures
on investment. Table 6 shows that if different categories of government expenditure are
included, linear as well as quadratic terms are significant in all regressions. These
results confirm that the non-linear effects are important for different categories of
government expenditures. Moreover, the nature of the relationship differs for different
expenditure categories. For Wages and Subs we find an inverted-U curve: increasing the
levels of expenditures on these categories reduces private investment only after a certain
threshold value is surpassed (equations [6.2] and [6.5]).21 Alternatively, for Capexp,
Othgood and Intp we find a U curve. Thus, these spending categories only positively
affect private investment after a certain value is surpassed; for low values of
expenditure, these categories have a negative effect on private investment (equations
[6.3], [6.4] and [6.6]).22 Equation [6.1] shows that if all categories of government
expenditure are included simultaneously, Capexp, Othgood and Intp become
insignificant, whereas the results for Wages and Subs do not change qualitatively
change (although there are considerable changes in the coefficients). This may suggest
problems of multicollinearity.
To test for the extent to which these problems may influence the results presented in
Table 6, we show the results of an alternative regression analysis, in which we only
include those categories of expenditures in one equation that have simple correlation
coefficients of below 15 per cent. Correlation coefficients are shown in Tables 12 and
13. Table 7 shows the results of these alternative regressions. The analysis confirms the
results found earlier for Wages,a n dCapexp and Othgood: wage expenditures have a
positive effect on investment at low levels and a negative effect at high levels; for
capital expenditures and expenditures on other goods and services the relationship is the
opposite (equations [7.1]-[7.3]). Subs and Intp have a negative linear effect on private
investment; the non-linear relationship for these variables is no longer statistically
significant (equations [7.2]-[7.5]).
The results for the functional disaggregation of government expenditures are presented
in Table 8. The regression results show that Health and Socsec have a positive effect on
private investment at low levels of expenditure, but negative effects on private
investment for high levels, indicating the existence of an inverted-U curve (equations
[8.4] and [8.6]). In contrast, the relationship between expenditures on defence and
21 This result is also found when we investigate the non-linear relationship between Govcon and
investment (equation [6.8]).
22 The results for Pubinv are similar to those for Capexp.13
investment is characterised by a U-curve (equation [8.2]). Econaf has a positive, and
even increasing, effect on private investment: both the linear and the non-linear term are
significant and positive (equation [8.5]). Finally, expenditure on education has no effect
on investment (equation [8.3]), confirming the results found for this category in sub-
section 4.1.
Also with respect to the functional classification of government expenditures we find
that if all categories of government expenditure are included simultaneously the results
change, although not as dramatically as was the case in Table 6. Nevertheless, we test
for the influence of possible problems of multicollinearity on the results in Table 8.
Table 9 presents the results of an alternative regression analysis, in which we only
include those categories of expenditures in one equation that have simple correlation
coefficients of below 15 per cent. The results in Table 9 do not qualitatively differ from
those presented in Table 8.
Finally, we turn to the discussion of the non-linear relationship between different
categories of government revenues and investment. Table 10 presents the results of the
analysis. If government revenue variables are included separately in the regressions, the
results show that for Taxprof and Taxinttr the relationship with private investment is
characterised by an inverted-U curve: these tax categories start to have a negative
impact on private investment after a certain threshold level of tax revenues (equations
[10.4] and [10.6]). The reverse relationship is found for Domtax and Nontax (equations
[10.5] and [10.7]).
If all categories of government revenues are included simultaneously the results change
slightly. In particular, the linear and non-linear terms of Domtax are no longer
statistically significant (equation [10.1]). Including only combinations of categories of
government revenues with simple correlation coefficients below 15 per cent in the
regression does not change the results qualitatively (equations [10.2] and [10.3]).
However, in this regression the linear term of Domtax is significant and negative; the
non-linear term remains insignificant.
Overlooking the results of the regression analysis with respect to the existence of non-
linear relationships between different fiscal policy variables and private investment, we
may conclude that they are markedly different from the results found for the linear
relations. Our analysis has convincingly shown that for several categories of
government expenditures and revenues the relationship with private investment may be
better characterised by either an inverted-U curve or a U-curve, instead of a simple
linear relationship.
3.3 Financing government expenditures: a robustness check
Recently, a number of studies have shown that it matters how government expenditures
have been financed when analysing the relationship between fiscal policy and growth
(Kneller et al., 1999; Miller and Russek, 1997). In other words, the financing mode of
an increase in a specific government expenditure influences the impact of the
expenditure on investment and growth. If this is the case, it becomes important to know,
for example, whether an increase in infrastructure public investment is financed with
taxes, and if so, which taxes, or whether it is financed with a decrease of other14
expenditures, and if so, which expenditures. This also means that only including
government expenditures or government revenues in the regressions can be problematic,
since regression results may be misleading due to misspecification (Gemmell, 2000). If
a particular fiscal expenditure category is financed by one or more revenue categories,
then the coefficient for the expenditure category may include the impact of the revenue
categories on investment.
Our empirical analysis in the previous sub-sections may also suffer from this
misspecification problem. To circumvent the problem of misspecification, we carry out
a regression analysis, in which both government expenditure revenue categories are
included in the regression model. With respect to the government expenditures we focus
the analysis on two categories in particular: capital expenditures and wage expenditures.
Our aim is to investigate whether the results found in section 3.3 for these two
categories, i.e. an inverted-U relationship between Wages and private investment and a
U-curved relationship between Capexp and investment, still hold after taking into
account the financing mode of these expenditures. We acknowledge that our approach
does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the misspecification problem as described by
Kneller et al. and Miller and Russek. Our aim here is to take into account the influence
of the financing mode of an increase in specific government expenditure categories on
investment as a robustness check of our most important results in sub-section 3.1 and
3.2.
Table 11 presents the results of our analysis. First, we add linear terms of the different
revenue categories to the regression model including linear and non-linear terms of
capital and wage expenditures. The results for both expenditure categories found earlier
still hold after taking into account the financing mode of expenditures (equation [11.1]).
Note, however, that Domtax and Nontax are now insignificant (compare Table 4). If we
ignore these two revenue categories, the results for Wages and Capexp do not change
(equation [11.2]). Next, we include the quadratic terms for the revenue categories found
significant in equation [11.1]. Again, this does not affect the results for Capexp and
Wages (equation [11.3] and [11.4])). The non-linear component for Taxprof is
insignificant in this specification (compare Table 10).
We have included the threshold values of both Wages and Capexp i nr o w s1 3a n d1 4o f
Table 11. The results show the following. If expenditures on wages (as a percentage of
GDP) rise above 4 to 4.25 per cent, then such expenditures start to have a negative
effect on private investment. Moreover, capital expenditures start to have a positive
impact on private investment only after they have reached a level of 3.25 to 3.36 per
cent (of GDP).
The conclusion from the above described exercise seems to be justified that the
inverted-U relationship between Wages and private investment and the U-curved
relationship between Capexp and investment, still hold after taking into account the
financing mode of these expenditures.15
3.4 Interpreting the empirical results
The empirical results presented in the previous sub-sections can be summarised as
follows.
— The analysis has shown that it is important to take into account different
categories of government expenditures and revenues, instead of using
aggregate fiscal policy variables, as is done by most other studies. The results
clearly show that different categories have different effects on private
investment.
— The results also emphasise the importance of taking into account non-linearity
of relationships. In a number of cases, the results of the analysis of non-linear
relationships provide a different picture when compared to the results of the
analysis of linear relationships between fiscal policy and investment.
— The results for capital and wage expenditures do stand out in this respect. The
relationship between Wages and private investment is best described by an
inverted-U curve, whereas for Capexp there appears to be a U-curved
relationship with investment. These results can be interpreted as follows.
i) With respect to wage expenditures the results are in line with the view that
the central government needs a sufficient number of civil servants in order
to offer public services efficiently. After a certain number of civil servants,
however, the efficiency of services may reduce. Thus, the empirical results
support the view that there is an optimal number of civil servants, and thus
of government spending on their wages, associated with efficient public
services.
ii) With respect to capital expenditures the results support the view that such
expenditures (including, e.g., investment in infrastructure) become
effective only after some point, due to the fact that they usually are
associated with large (positive) externalities.
— We also find interesting results when using a functional disaggregation of
expenditures. In particular, we discover that there is an inverted-U curved
relationship between Health and private investment and a U-curved
relationship between Defence and private investment. These results can be
interpreted as follows:
i) Expenditure on health stimulates investment until the optimum level of
operation is reached; further expenditure on this category may then retard
growth.
ii) Expenditure on defence is comparable to expenditure on capital in the
sense that it is associated with positive externalities. These externalities are
related to research and development activities in the defence industry that
spill-over to the private sector. However, such spill-over effects become
effective only after defence expenditures have reached a minimum level.
This explains the U-curved relationship between defence expenditure and
investment
— We do not find any relationship between expenditure on education and private
investment. Similar results have been found elsewhere in the literature,16
although these studies focus on the relationship between fiscal policy and
growth (see, e.g., Devarajan et al. 1996; Miller and Russek 1997).
— In general, we do not find that the relationship between fiscal policy variables
and investment is different for LDCs as compared to OECD countries.
Devarajan et al., (1996) and Miller and Russek (1997) suggest that this is the
case when looking at growth effects of fiscal policy. Thus, for example they
find a negative effect of capital expenditure on growth. Their explanation is
that “…expenditures which are normally considered productive could become
unproductive if there is an excessive amount of them.” (Devarajan et al. 1996,
pp.338-339) Our contribution of taking into account the possibility of non-
linear relationships may, however, explain the seemingly puzzling findings of
these studies: capital expenditure becomes effective only after it has reached a
minimum level. In other words, the countries in the sample of the study by
Devarajan et al. and Miller and Russek generally did not invest enough in
public capital.
— The results with respect to the different categories of government revenues are
less clear-cut. They appear to be sensitive to the exact specification of the
model.
4 Concluding remarks
Our study is related to the empirical research on the macroeconomic impact of fiscal
policy. We have made a number of important contributions to the existing empirical
literature on this issue. First, we empirically analyse the impact of fiscal policy on
macroeconomic performance of LDCs. Empirical evidence on this issue is scarce for
these countries. Second, we specifically look at the impact of fiscal policy on private
investment. Third, we provide a comprehensive study of the relationship between a
large number of government expenditure and revenue categories, and private
investment. Yet, our main contribution to existing literature is that it is the first serious
attempt to analyse the existence of a non-linear relationship between fiscal policy
variables and private investment.
The empirical results show that taking into account different government expenditure
and revenue categories is important: different categories have different effects on
investment. This outcome is not picked up when aggregate fiscal variables are used,
which is the approach of the main part of the empirical literature. Moreover,
relationships between specific fiscal categories and investment appear to be non-linear.
In particular, we show that capital expenditure and expenditure on defence start to have
a positive impact on private investment only after a minimum level of expenditure on
these categories has been reached. Moreover, with respect to expenditures on wages and
health, we find that they stimulate investment up to a certain level. If expenditures on
both categories are increased beyond this level, investment is reduced.
The results of this study may have important policy implications. Most importantly, it
shows that LDC governments need to be aware of the fact that their expenditure and
revenue policies need to be carried out carefully. Simply raising or reducing
expenditures on education, health or infrastructure may not bring the expected positive
effects on private investment or may even hurt private investment. In some cases levels
of expenditure on health may already be too high and further spending on this category17
will reduce, rather than stimulate investment. In other cases, expenditure on capital may
be too low and further spending is needed in order to obtain positive effects of public
capital on investment. Therefore, policy makers in LDCs should consider the threshold
values for the different policy instruments they want to use to stimulate private
investment before deciding to reduce or increase expenditures and revenues.
The analysis also has important implications with respect to the contents of fiscal policy
reform programmes of the IMF and World Bank. Several LDC countries are currently
struggling with (large) fiscal imbalances. These countries need to reduce large fiscal
deficits, but do not have a clear guide of how to achieve this without hurting their long-
term economic prospects. Moreover, a number of countries, after having managed to
reduce their fiscal deficits, are now considering second-generation economic reforms
for countries. For these countries it is important to know what combination of public
spending and revenues will be most helpful to achieve higher growth and poverty
reduction.
In the past, fiscal policy reform programmes have been too standard. Policy
recommendations were focused too much on aggregate fiscal variables. They did not
take into account that reducing expenditures of some categories may actually hurt
investment and growth. In many LDCs this resulted in the practice of cutting on capital
expenditures in order to reduce budget deficits (Ramirez 1996; Toye 2000). We have
shown that this practice may be particularly harmful for investment and growth
prospects in cases where the threshold value for capital expenditures has not yet been
reached.
To conclude, the analysis in this paper has shown that a reduction of budget deficits as
such is not a panacea and can be even harmful. The combination of specific expenditure
and revenue reforms may be of crucial importance. Perhaps, the IMF and World Bank
could take the lead in designing programmes that contain the optimum mix of
government expenditure and revenue changes so that budget deficits can be reduced
without harming, and possibly even stimulating investment and growth.
Finally, there are several useful directions for further research. It may be important to
further assess the impact of government expenditures on private investment by
disaggregating government expenditures in expenditures to different sectors, such as
infrastructure, education, housing or health. A fruitful extension may also be to try to
examine the sensitivity of the results for the set of countries used by, for instance,
distinguishing between different groups of countries. Finally, further research may
elaborate on the impact of the financing mode of government expenditures on the
relationship between different fiscal policy variables and investment and growth.18
Table 1
Total government expenditures and revenues:
linear effects
1234
log(1+bmp) -0.396* -0.413* -0.415* -0.592*




N 7 47 47 48 3
adj. R
2 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.83
Note: The estimation technique is GLS (generalised least squares, with cross section weights). In all
estimates fixed effects are taken into account, as well as time dummies for the 1970s and 1980s.
R
2 is the adjusted R
2 for the unweighted model. *) denotes significant at the 1 per cent level; **)
denotes significant at the 5 per cent level; ***) denotes significant at the 10 per cent level. The
dependent variable in all equations is private investment as a percentage of GDP.
Table 2




-0.209 -0.293* -0.302* -0.674* -0.546* -0.446* -0.425* -0.749*








N 7 47 57 58 18 17 9 1 1 0 1 0 9
adj. R
2 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.84
Note: see note to table 1.19
Table 3
Private investment and functional classification of government expenditures: linear effects
123456
Log(1+bmp) -0.405* -0.495* -0.318* -0.414* -0.314* -0.598*






N 6 67 27 37 37 36 8
adj. R
2 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.80
Note: see note to table 1.
Table 4
Private investment and government revenues:
linear effects
12345
log(1+bmp) -0.588* -0.638* -0.495* -0.619* -0.568*





N 8 18 18 18 18 1
R
2 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.82
Note: see note to table 1.20
Table 5
Total government expenditures and revenues:
non-linear effects
1234
Log(1+bmp) -0.734* -0.397* -0.371* -0.584*










N 7 47 47 48 3
Adj. R
2 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.83
Note: see note to table 1.
Table 6
Private investment and government expenditures: non-linear effects
12345678
log(1+bmp) -0.062 -0.403* -0.365* -0.807* -0.425* -0.476* -0.480* -0.800*






















N 7 47 57 58 18 17 91 1 0 1 0 9
adj R
2 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83
Note: see note to table 1.21
Table 7
Private investment and government expenditures:
combination of variables with correlation coefficients below 0.15
12345
log(1+bmp) -0.526* -0.223* -0.236* -0.432* -0.280*
log(gdp) 5.664* 5.187* 5.213* 5.882* 5.586*
Wages 1.024* 0.841* 1.181*
Wages













N 7 47 57 57 57 5
adj R
2 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.84
Note: see note to table 1.
Table 8
Private investment and functional classification of government expenditures:
non-linear effects
123456
log(1+bmp) -0.322** -0.613* -0.304* -0.433* -0.278* -0.424*
















N 6 67 27 37 37 36 8
adj. R
2 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80
Note: see note to table 1.22
Table 9
Private investment and functional classification of government expenditures, combination of
variables with correlation coefficients below 0.15
123
log(1+bmp) -0.513* -0.169** -0.139













N7 2 6 7 6 7
adj. R
2 0.83 0.80 0.81
Note: see note to table 1.
Table 10
: Private investment and government revenues:
non-linear effects
1232345
Log(1+bmp) -0.744* -0.779* -0.771* -0.607* -0.481* -0.633* -0.591*
Log(gdp) 4.541* 4.984* 4.958* 5.059* 5.533* 5.891* 5.671*
Taxprof 1.100* 1.042* 1.014* 1.054*
Taxprof
2 -0.052** -0.051* -0.046* -0.050**
Domtax -0.098 -0.574* -0.307* -0.705*
Domtax
2 -0.021 0.021 0.036*
Taxinttr 0.329*** 0.579* 0.590* 0.564*
Taxinttr




N 8 18 18 18 18 18 18 1
R
2 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82
Note: see note to table 1.23
Table 11
Government expenditures and revenues
1234
log(1+bmp) -0.586* -0.572* -0.542* -0.544*
log(gdp) 5.923* 5.694* 5.106* 5.150*
Wages 0.707*** 0.582** 0.530*** 0.540***
Wages
2 -0.083* -0.073* -0.064** -0.064**
Capexp -0.467** -0.450* -0.452*** -0.463***
Capexp
2 0.071* 0.069* 0.068* 0.069*










4.26 3.99 4.14 4.22
Threshold value for
Capexp
3.29 3.26 3.32 3.36
N 7 47 47 47 4
adj R
2 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.81
Note: see note to table 1.24
Table 12
: Correlation matrix government expenditures
Wages Intp Capexp Subs Othgood Defence Education Health Econaf Socsec
Wages 1.00
Intp -0.12 1.00
Capexp 0.01 0.20 1.00
Subs -0.001 0.26 -0.16 1.00
Othgood 0.28 0.28 0.44 0.03 1.00
Defence 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.49 1.00
Education 0.37 0.11 0.49 0.09 0.57 0.20 1.00
Health 0.33 0.23 0.34 0.40 0.34 -0.06 0.65 1.00
Econaf 0.01 0.26 0.88 -0.07 0.61 0.20 0.59 0.41 1.00
Socsec -0.08 0.22 -0.23 0.88 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.38 -0.17 1.00
Table 13
Correlation matrix government revenues
Taxprof Domtax Nontax Taxinttr
Taxprof 1.00
Domtax 0.10 1.00
Nontax 0.32 0.09 1.00
Taxinttr -0.05 -0.10 0.10 1.00
Appendix A: list of variables
BMP: black market premium
Capexp: capital expendititures (% of GDP)
Defence: defense expenditures of government (% of GDP)
Domtax: domestic taxes on goods and services (% of GDP)
Education: education expenditures of government (% of GDP)
Econaf: government expenditures on economic affairs and services (% of
GDP). This includes expenditures on 1) agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting, 2) mining, 3) fuel and energy, 4)
transportation and communication and 5) other economic affairs
and services.25
GDP: initial value of real GDP per capita
Govcon: government consumption (% of GDP)
Govexp: total government expenditures (% of GDP)23
Govrev: total government revenues and grants (% of GDP)24
Health: health expenditures of government (% of GDP)
Intp: interest payments of the government (% of GDP)
Nontax: non-tax revenue (for government) (% of GDP)
Othgood: other purchases of goods and services (% of GDP)
Privinv: private investment (% of GDP)
Pubinv: public investment (% of GDP)
Socsec: government expenditures on social security and welfare (% of
GDP)
Subs: subsidies plus other current transfers (% of GDP)
Surplus: Govrev – Govexp25
Taxinttr: taxes on international trade and transactions (% of GDP)
Taxprof: taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of GDP)
Wages: wages and salaries (employer contribution; % of GDP)
Data sources that have been used for the analysis are the folowing:
- William Easterly and H. Yu, Global Development Network Growth Database,
Washington DC: The World Bank, 1999. (see also the website of the World Bank:
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg/grthweb/gdndata/htlm)
- IMF, Government Financial Statistics, CD-Rom.
23 Govexp = wages + othgood + intp + subs + capexp. Note that the sum of wages + othgood equals
current expenditures on goods and services (not used in estimations). Note also that the sum of
Defence, Education, Health, Econaf and Socsec does not add up to govexp. The difference is made up
by, amongst others, government expenditures on housing and recreation.
24 Note that Taxprof + Taxinttr + Domtax + Nontax are not equal to Govrev. Small differences are
possible due to grants and some unimportant taxes.
25 Note also that surplus is not entirely equal to the overall government surplus. The difference is
loans minus repayments.26
- World Bank, World Tables, CD-Rom.
- Lawrence Bouton and Mariusz Sumlinski, Trends in Private Investment in
Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970-98, Washington DC: International
Finance Corporation, June 2000.
- Penn World Table 5.6.
Appendix B: list of countries used in the analysis
In the equations including Govexp, Wages, Intp, Subs and Capexp the following (33)
countries are included:
Argentina; Belize; Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote
d’Ivoire; Dominican Republic; Egypt; Guatemala; Guinea-Bissau; India; Indonesia;
Iran; Korea; Madagascar; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Morocco; Panama; Paraguay;
Peru; Poland; Romania; South Africa; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Uruguay and
Venezuela.
In equations including Govrev, Taxprof, Domtax, Taxinttr and Nontax 35 instead of 33
countries are included in the sample. For these variables Namibia and Pakistan are
added to the standard sample of countries.
The number of observations for individual equations presented in the tables may not be
equal to three times the number of countries due to missing data for some countries for
one or more sub-periods.
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